美国国家安全信息豁免公开的双重路径On the Dual Paths of the National Security Information Exemption from Disclosure in the United States
李淮;蔡瑶;
摘要(Abstract):
行政特权与《信息自由法》中的第一豁免条款共同开辟了美国国家安全信息豁免公开的两条路径。第一豁免条款确立的"国防、外交利益"保密标准,取代了原"公共利益"保密标准,限制了豁免公开范围,具有进步意义。经过1974年修法,豁免条款被增设限制条件,强调定密信息的"事实上"和"适当"两要素,注重"事前定密"规范性。法院在国家安全信息案件中极为尊让,多止于形式审查,采行"有效规范依据→定密特殊要求→主体资格正当"的审查标准,但也能动地创造了"沃恩索引",弥补了仅审查行政宣誓书的不足。通过实践发展而来的行政特权,由总统及相关高级官员所行使,旨在依法不向立法机关和司法机关公开特定政府信息,但其主张应当合理,局限为军事、外交和国家安全事项。反观我国,有必要批判吸收美国经验,保证真正的国家秘密受到保护,非涉密事项不被排除于公开范围,实现"以公开为原则,以保密为例外",推动政府信息公开制度取得运行实效和精细化发展。
关键词(KeyWords): 国家安全信息;豁免公开;第一豁免条款;行政特权;信息自由法
基金项目(Foundation): 北京市法学会2019年市级法学研究课题青年课题“行政规范性文件合法性审查标准研究”(项目编号:BLS(2019)C006)的阶段性成果
作者(Author): 李淮;蔡瑶;
Email:
DOI:
参考文献(References):
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- (1)5 U.S.C.§552(1946).
- (2)5 U.S.C.§552(1946):“(b)any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest”.
- (3)5 U.S.C.§552(b)(1966).
- (4)5 U.S.C.§552(b)(3).
- (5)5 U.S.C.§552(b)(5).
- (6)5 U.S.C.§552(b)(7).
- (7)明克案中,国会议员派西·明克等人向美国联邦环境保护署申请获取地下核试验的相关文件,联邦环境保护署主张该文件适用《信息自由法》第一豁免条款和第五豁免条款的规定,即涉及国防和外交事宜而依行政命令予以保密的信息,以及在诉讼中无需披露的行政机关内部的备忘录或信件,其中至少有六份文件被主张涉及高度敏感的国防和外交信息且依据第10501号行政命令已被认定为“最高机密”和“机密”。
- (8)5 U.S.C.§552(b)(1)(1974).
- (9)5 U.S.C.§552(a)(3)(1966).
- (10)5 U.S.C.§552(a)(3)(1966).
- (11)5 U.S.C.§552(b).
- (12)5 U.S.C.§552(a)(4)(B)(1974).
- (13)“信息不对称”原是经济学领域的理论,该理论主张市场经济活动的不同主体对于有关信息的了解程度存在差异,且此种差异会带来有利与不利地位的差异。
- (14)简易判决(summary judgment)是指当事人认为案件事实不存在任何争议且其在法律上应当胜诉,从而向法院提出的一种申请(motion)。See 28 U.S.C.A.F.R.C.P.Rule 56.
- (15)司法机关在处理国家安全信息豁免公开案件时,存在混淆“信息”与“文件”“档案”“记录”的情况。以明克案为例,上诉法院要求对涉案文件进行审查并区分出不属于国家秘密的信息,而地区法院与联邦最高法院则主张进行形式审查并拒绝对文件进行区分审查,该做法恰是体现了对“信息”概念的错误理解。此为笔者阅读案例之发现,并非本文重点,故不再展开论述。
- (16)在沃恩案中,文官委员会援引了三项豁免条款拒绝公开涉案文件,包括第二豁免条款(仅涉及机关内部的规则和措施)、第五豁免条款(机关内部或者与其他机关之间的备忘录或信件)以及第六豁免条款(一旦公开会明显侵犯个人隐私的个人档案、医疗档案或者其他档案)。虽然该案本身未直接涉及第一豁免条款,但沃恩案确立的沃恩索引审查制度后来广泛应用于信息公开案件,包括国家安全信息豁免公开诉讼。
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- (20)5 U.S.C.§552(f)(1).
- (21)5 U.S.C.§552(f)(1).See also 5 U.S.C.§551(1).
- (22)U.S.C.A.Const.art.I § 1.
- (23)U.S.C.A.Const.art.III.
- (24)5 U.S.C.§551(2).